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Abstract  
Is phenomenal consciousness constitutively related to cognitive access? Despite being a 
fundamental issue for any science of consciousness, its empirical study faces a severe 
methodological puzzle. Recent years have seen numerous attempts to address this puzzle, 
either in practice, by offering evidence for a positive or negative answer, or in principle, by 
proposing a framework for eventual resolution. The present paper critically considers these 
endeavours, including partial-report, metacognitive and no-report paradigms, as well as the 
theoretical proposal that we can make progress by studying phenomenal consciousness as a 
natural kind. It is argued that the methodological puzzle remains obdurately with us and that, 
for now, we must adopt an attitude of humility towards the phenomenal. 
  
Keywords: Phenomenal Consciousness, Cognitive Access, Methodological Puzzle, 
Phenomenal Overflow, Partial-Report Paradigms, No-Report Paradigms 
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The Methodological Puzzle of Phenomenal Consciousness 
At the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness in 2012, Ned Block 
confidently wagered that disputes over whether phenomenal consciousness constitutively 
requires cognitive access would be settled within the decade. Since then, much innovative 
work has been undertaken. Yet no consensus has emerged. This reflects a deep 
methodological puzzle confronting consciousness science which Block himself highlights 
[1,2]. The study of consciousness must begin with putative cases of consciousness and 
unconsciousness. However, the evidence used to identify such cases (e.g. verbal report or 
intentional action) is equally evidence of the presence or absence of cognitive access. Thus, 
all our initial cases of consciousness will be presumptive cases of both consciousness and 
access, or of neither. Given this starting point—so the puzzle goes—how could we ever 
establish whether consciousness can occur without access? 
The present paper offers a critical review of recent experimental and theoretical 
responses to the puzzle. Section one clarifies the issue at the centre of recent disputes. Section 
two reviews and extends earlier criticisms of partial-report studies commonly put forward as 
evidence of consciousness without access. Section three explains why such criticisms equally 
apply to studies intended to support the contrary claim that consciousness requires cognitive 
access. Section four challenges the contention that no-report paradigms can help resolve our 
quandary. Finally, section five, offers a sceptical assessment of an important theoretical 
framework intended to overcome the methodological puzzle due to Shea [3]. 
1. The Access Hypothesis 
Consider a state of a subject, S, with content, p. To say that phenomenal 
consciousness constitutively requires cognitive access is to impose a condition on S being a 
conscious state. Current debate focuses on the following condition [2,4,5]. 
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Access Hypothesis  S is a conscious state only if its content p is “directly” available 
to its subject (that is: exploitable without the need for any 
further processing) to perform a wide-range of cognitive tasks 
such as reporting that p, or reasoning or acting on the basis of 
p. 
 
More or less demanding access hypotheses can be formulated. More strongly, one might 
insist that S’s content must actually be exploited for S to be conscious. More weakly, one 
might drop the requirement of “direct” availability. Here I focus on the Access Hypothesis as 
stated. 
Pressing a version of the methodological puzzle, Cohen and Dennett contend that 
because the hypothesis of consciousness without access “cannot be empirically confirmed or 
falsified” [6, p. 358], it is unscientific and so “doomed” [p. 363]. However, Cohen and 
Dennett’s considerations at best establish that the hypothesis of conscious without function is 
unscientific.
i
 Despite the impression they give, such a claim falls far short of the Access 
Hypothesis. This is for two reasons. First, the cognitive functions mentioned in the Access 
Hypothesis do not exhaust all psychological functions. For example, Cohen and Dennett hold 
that “affective, emotional or ‘limbic’ reactions are … types of functions” by which the 
presence of consciousness could be evidenced [p. 361]. But these are not themselves 
cognitive functions as construed by the Access Hypothesis. Second, one can reject the Access 
Hypothesis on the basis that some conscious contents are only indirectly available. Yet 
indirect availability remains a functional characterisation (cf. [7]). 
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The Access Hypothesis maps onto well-established views concerning the neural and 
informational underpinnings of cognitive access. For example, in developing their influential 
global neuronal workspace model, Dehaene and Naccache distinguish three levels of 
accessibility: “Some information encoded in the nervous system is permanently inaccessible 
(set I1). Other information is in contact with the workspace and could be consciously 
amplified if it was attended to (set I2). However, at any given time, only a subset of the latter 
is mobilized into the workspace (set I3)” [8, p. 30] (see also [9]). The Access Hypothesis 
corresponds to the claim that only mobilized information (set I3) is conscious. Critics of the 
Access Hypothesis instead contend that information which is merely in contact with the 
workspace (set I2) can be phenomenally consciousness [1]. Similarly, Lamme makes a critical 
distinction between “Stage 3” localized recurrent processing restricted to occipito-temporal 
areas and which “cannot directly influence motor control and other functions necessary for 
direct report” [10, p. 219], and “Stage 4” widespread recurrent processing involving fronto-
parietal circuits which directly supports executive functions. The Access Hypothesis 
corresponds to the claim that consciousness requires Stage 4, global processing. Lamme thus 
rejects the Access Hypothesis when he argues that phenomenal consciousness is associated 
with Stage 3, localized recurrent processing. 
Critics of the Access Hypothesis often also contend that conscious perception is rich 
whereas cognition is sparse. For example, Block rejects the Access Hypothesis on the 
grounds that the capacity of perceptual consciousness exceeds or “overflows” the capacity of 
cognitive access. However, the claim that conscious perception is rich is not, in and of itself, 
inconsistent with the Access Hypothesis. The apparent conflict arises from two further 
assumptions. First, that cognitive access is identifiable with presence in working memory. 
Second, that working memory has a strictly limited (say, four item) capacity. 
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Both assumptions can be challenged. Carruthers [4] accepts that working memory is 
capacity limited but denies that cognitive access equates to presence in working memory. 
Instead, he argues that cognitive access requires either of two forms of global broadcasting. 
The first form corresponds to working memory. This is capacity limited because it lacks 
support from bottom-up, stimulus driven activity, and so must exclusively rely on top-down 
attention to sustain its contents. The second form corresponds to online perception. This, 
Carruthers claims, allows much richer broadcast of information due to the support of bottom-
up sensory activity, rendering rich perceptual consciousness consistent with the Access 
Hypothesis. Gross and Flombaum [11] offer an alternative way of combining rich perception 
with the Access Hypothesis by appeal to a conception of working memory as a continuous, 
flexibly-distributed and capacity-unlimited resource (see [12,13] as well as the rather 
different model of [14] discussed in [5]). This again affords a reconciliation of phenomenal 
richness with the Access Hypothesis (see also [15] discussed in [16]). 
For these reasons, the main focus herein is neither overflow nor richness but the 
Access Hypothesis. That said, I do press the methodological puzzle by disputing studies 
purporting to evidence overflow since overflow is inconsistent with the Access Hypothesis. 
Moreover, since the theoretical contentions of Carruthers, and Gross and Flombaum remain 
controversial, I do not rely on either in what follows. Note though that decoupling the Access 
Hypothesis from overflow does not resolve the methodological puzzle. The question remains 
whether a state can be conscious without access, and correspondingly whether consciousness 
should be associated with localized as opposed to globally recurrent processing, or with being 
in contact with the workspace as opposed to actual mobilization into it. 
2. Retrocueing Paradigms and a Recipe for Puzzlement 
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A substantial body of work exploiting variants on Sperling’s classic partial-report 
paradigm [17] claims to provide evidence against the Access Hypothesis, and in favour of 
overflow. Phillips [18] proposes a two-step recipe for replying: (1) accept (for argument’s 
sake) whatever interpretation is offered of the relevant data construed in purely 
representational or informational terms; (2) dispute the “bridging assumptions” used to move 
from this representational account to claims concerning consciousness. 
Take Sperling’s original task, widely viewed as evidence of phenomenology without 
access (e.g. [1,19–22] though cf. [8, p. 8] and [15] on which [16]). Following our recipe, we 
accept the informational import of Sperling’s data, granting that they evidence a brief-lived, 
high-capacity “iconic memory” store selectively transferable to a stabler, low-capacity store 
supporting verbal report. We then deny that the full capacity of the iconic store figures in 
phenomenal consciousness. Instead we propose that only those contents which ultimately 
reach explicit or working memory do. For variations on this theme see [6,23–27]. 
More recently, a series of studies from Lamme’s Amsterdam Group exploit a change 
detection task with retrocues at delays of 1–4s to argue for the existence of a fragile sensory 
memory store with roughly twice the capacity of working memory [28–30]. In the version of 
this paradigm used in Vandenbroucke et al. [31], subjects view a memory display of oriented 
rectangles for 250ms followed by a blank interval. In “iconic” and “sensory memory” 
conditions, this is followed by a 500ms retrocue highlighting the location of one of the 
rectangles after either 50ms (iconic condition) or 1000ms (sensory condition). After another 
500ms, a test display is then presented in which the cued rectangle differs in orientation on 
half of trials. Subjects then indicate whether a change has occurred. In the “working memory” 
condition, the test display is shown 900ms after memory display offset, followed 100ms later, 
by a 500ms postcue. The test display then remains visible until the subject has made their 
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change judgment. The headline finding is that capacity (reported as number of items stored) 
is substantially greater in iconic and sensory as compared to working memory conditions. 
This work is controversial. Critics have questioned the postulation of a distinct, high-
capacity fragile memory store, either disputing the capacity claim [32] or arguing that the 
retrocueing effect can be understood in terms of inference and cue-driven stabilization effects 
within a single store [33,34] (see further discussion of these results in light of more recent 
models of working memory in [11]). However, let us set these issues aside and focus on the 
relation between the fragile representations postulated by the Amsterdam Group and 
conscious experience. The Amsterdam Group’s view [29,35,10] and Block’s [1,7] who 
follows them is that such fragile representations are conscious despite not entering (or being 
stabilized within) working memory. They thus contradict the Access Hypothesis. 
Our recipe above provides a response on behalf of proponents of the Access 
Hypothesis. First, accept the existence of fragile representations as required to explain the 
retrocueing effect. Second, deny that all such representations correspond to elements in 
conscious experience. Of particular interest are the representations of items which are 
retrocued but were not spontaneously attended when the memory display was first shown. 
Cohen and Dennett [6, p. 362] claim that such representations “are stored unconsciously until 
the cue brings them to the focus of attention” at which point they become conscious. Phillips 
[24, p. 406] suggests that such representations may never reach consciousness. Instead, he 
suggests that, when cued, they may lead the corresponding test display rectangle to be 
experienced as “(un)familiar” or “(un)changed” (despite the earlier rectangle never having 
been consciously experienced). In the case where the rectangle has not changed orientation, 
experienced familiarity may reflect perceptual fluency due to prior exposure to a matching 
stimulus in the relevant location (cf. [36–38], and esp. [39]). Conversely, where the rectangle 
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has changed, a lack of fluency or perceptual “hesitancy” due to mismatch may be 
experienced as unfamiliarity. 
Both these stories are consistent with the Access Hypothesis. Phillips’ story avoids 
the concern that it is “implausible that unconsciously perceived stimuli can evoke conscious 
memories” [40, p. 223]. However, it faces its own objection, namely that subjects in a variant 
of the change detection task using pictures of familiar objects are significantly above chance 
at identifying the pre-change item from a set of four options when they successfully detect a 
change [30]. However, this can again be explained in term terms of fluency: subjects’ 
previous unconscious exposure to one of the four options causes it to be experienced as more 
familiar than the other three items. 
More recent studies from the Amsterdam Group purport to provide evidence of the 
association of fragile memory and consciousness (and so against the Access Hypothesis) on 
the grounds that metacognition is insignificantly different between fragile and working 
memory representations. In particular, Vandenbroucke et al. [31] (also [40]) extended the 
basic Amsterdam Group paradigm by asking subjects to indicate their confidence in their 
change detection judgement. Consistent with previous results, Vandenbroucke et al. found 
that memory capacity decreased from around ten items in the fragile condition to just under 
six in the working memory condition. Factoring in a further experiment, and exploiting a 
measure of metacognition, meta-d'-balance [41], intended to avoid the influence of varying 
response bias, the authors report broadly similar metacognition in both conditions. 
Vandenbroucke et al. conclude that “the higher capacity of fragile memory is not based on 
implicit, unconscious information” and thus that “sensory memory items are a meaningful 
part of visual experience” [31, pp. 868,870]. 
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This interpretation assumes that if metacognitive performance concerning fragile 
memory is equal to that of working memory, then the information in fragile memory is 
conscious information. Against this, one might doubt that all working memory 
representations are conscious [42,43]. One might also question the association between 
metacognition and consciousness [44–47]. 
A more basic objection faces the interpretation, however. Metacognition was only 
measured for judgments concerning cued representations. These representations have, 
according to Vandenbroucke et al., been “made robust and available for report and for 
cognitive manipulations” [31, p. 861]. To conclude from this that there is accurate 
metacognition for all items in fragile memory requires generalizing from this cued 
representation. Yet strictly all that can be inferred is that “information required to support 
high metacognition on the entire capacity … must have been present up to the point of cue 
presentation” [31, p. 870]. This does not entail that subjects actually have metacognitive 
access to the entire capacity. Information required to detect changes in most of the rectangles 
must have been present up to the point of the cue. Yet plainly it does not follow from this that 
subjects are able to detect changes in most of the rectangles independent of the cue. Without 
a cue (and the attentional processing attendant on it) they mostly cannot. By the same token, 
we cannot assume metacognition in the absence of a cue and its attendant processing. The 
Access Hypothesis is thus unscathed by Vandenbroucke et al.’s data. Again we see the 
yawning gap between an informational story offered in explanation of certain task-
performance data, and a corresponding phenomenological story. This gap precisely reflects 
the methodological puzzle at the heart of our discussion. 
3. The Methodological Puzzle is a Two-Way Sword 
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 This section offers two examples to illustrate that the methodological puzzle applies 
equally to evidence which allegedly favours the Access Hypothesis. 
Sergent et al. 2013 
In previous work [23,24] I suggested that Sperling’s partial-report paradigm fails to 
provide compelling evidence against the Access Hypothesis because it is equally subject to a 
“postdictive” interpretation on which subjects’ experiences are not determined independently 
of the postcue. In an elegant subsequent study, Sergent et al. [48] purport to provide clear 
evidence of this type of effect. Using postcues at delays of up to 400ms, they argue that 
“postcued attention can retrospectively trigger the conscious perception of a stimulus that 
would otherwise have escaped consciousness” (p. 150). However, the response recipe offered 
above can be used to supply an informationally equivalent but phenomenologically quite 
distinct interpretation of the postcueing effect found by Sergent et al. On this alternative 
interpretation the postcue does not trigger conscious perception but improves attention-based 
retention and subsequent access to already conscious experience. This interpretation 
(effectively the traditional interpretation of cueing in Sperling’s paradigm) is consistent with 
theories according to which recurrent local interactions are sufficient for consciousness, and 
hence with access-free phenomenology. 
 Sergent et al. claim their “data … favor a perceptual interpretation”, reasoning as 
follows: “Postcueing’s major effect was to reduce the number of trials where participants 
claimed they did not see any target at all… if postcueing only improved memory of an 
already conscious percept, one would expect participants to shift their ratings from low, but 
still above 0%, visibilities toward higher visibilities, but not to change their claim of having 
seen the target at all” (pp. 152–3). However, there is no reason why the overflow theorist 
should predict shifts of the kind Sergent et al. suggest. Overflow theorists can perfectly well 
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hold that all-or-nothing encoding is a requirement for reporting visibility. This is evident if 
we think in terms of the response recipe provided above. Following this, the overflow theorist 
can simply adopt Sergent et al.’s own informational story concerning which representations 
are encoded for explicit report, disputing only the further claim that these are the only 
representations corresponding to conscious awareness. 
Ward, Bear and Scholl 2016 
Bronfman et al. [49], exploiting a modified Sperling paradigm using coloured letters, 
find that subjects can judge the colour-diversity of letters in uncued rows significantly above 
chance and, apparently, without cost to letter recall. They argue that this ability requires the 
conscious representation of the individual colours which ground the diversity judgement, and 
so constitutes novel evidence of overflow (see also [50]). Disputing this claim, both I [18] 
and Ward et al. [51] argue—in line with the recipe above—that even if the diversity judgment 
requires the representation of the individual colours, there is no reason (either in Bronfman’s 
primary or supplementary data) to assume that such representations are conscious. Instead, it 
may simply be summary statistic representations (e.g. of “diversely coloured letters” in 
uncued rows) which correspond to consciousness. 
Ward et al. go further, however, offering experimental evidence positively in favour 
of a “no overflow” interpretation of Bronfman et al.’s data. First, subjects were offered a 
more nuanced colour awareness scale allowing them to report: (a) no sense of colour; (b) a 
vague sense of colour, but not of individual letters’ colours; (c) a clear sense of colour but not 
of individual letters’ colours; and finally (d) a clear sense of individual letters’ colours. Ward 
et al. found that most subjects claimed to perceive “color only in a general sense, without 
perceiving individual letters’ colors” (i.e. chose options (b) or (c); p. 83). Moreover, subjects’ 
diversity estimation was above chance just when they chose options (b)-(d) and did not 
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appear any more accurate when subjects chose option (d) as opposed to (b). Second, Ward et 
al. developed a clever change blindness paradigm in which the colours of letters in uncued 
rows were reshuffled on half of trials, preserving their diversity. Subjects completely failed to 
notice such changes despite being equally good at estimating diversity. Understandably, 
Ward et al. conclude that these “results are consistent with accounts of sparse visual 
awareness” (p. 83). 
The problem with both pieces of evidence, however, is that both sides agree that 
information about individual colours is not encoded in explicit/working memory. Yet this 
informational claim suffices to explain why subjects will not report seeing individual colours 
but only colour-diversity since only the latter is encoded in explicit memory. The 
informational claim also suffices to explain change blindness. Change blindness (or better: 
difference ignorance, cf. [52]) is predicted since information about individual pre-change 
colours cannot be compared with information about post-change colours if it is not explicitly 
encoded. Change blindness is also predicted on the interpretation of change detection in 
retrocue paradigms mooted in Phillips [24, p. 406] where the memory display item is not 
encoded in explicit memory. For there too change detection depends on cue-driven 
attentional processing of the pre-change item(s). 
It is important to recognize that this is not ad hoc theorizing designed to insulate 
phenomenal overflow from counter-evidence. Bronfman et al. themselves hypothesize that 
information about individual colours is not transferred “to a durable working memory store” 
and so “not encoded for later report” [49, p. 1395]. As a result, they ought to predict the very 
same data which Ward et al. find. And, indeed, Bronfman et al. make essentially this point in 
reply to [27]. The fact that the data cannot decide between two quite different theories here 
simply underscores the methodological problem at the heart of this paper—a problem which 
cuts both ways. 
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4. No-Report Paradigms 
A number of authors have expressed optimism that so-called “no-report” paradigms, 
which attempt to investigate awareness in the absence of explicit reports, will uncover the 
true neural basis of consciousness, and so resolve the methodological puzzle. Tsuchiya et al., 
for example, emphasize no-report data in making their case that the “activation and structural 
integrity of the frontal areas seems to be neither necessary nor sufficient for conscious 
perception” [53, p. 762] (see further [54,55]). On the widely-held assumption that cognitive 
access is subserved by frontal areas, this amounts to the rejection of the Access Hypothesis.
ii
 
In an ingenious and paradigmatic no-report paradigm, Frässle et al. [56] use two 
objective measures of perceptual alteration in binocular rivalry (viz. optokinetic nystagmus 
and pupil size) to assess the neural correlates of rivalry both with and without active report. 
Simplifying for argument’s sake, they find that differential neural activity in frontal areas is 
present only in their active report condition. In their passive condition, differential activation 
is limited to occipital and parietal areas.
iii
 Do such findings evidence that phenomenal 
consciousness is independent of cognitive access? I now argue that such a reaction would be 
precipitate (cf. [57]). 
Frässle et al., in keeping with the vast majority of recent work on rivalry, are 
“concerned with the search for neural processes that bring about the spontaneous perceptual 
alternations that characterize multistable perception” [58, p. 81 my emphasis]. Their question 
is whether frontal activations cause perceptual alterations, or instead whether such alterations 
originate with earlier processes. This explains why the large majority of studies employ a 
“replay” condition in which unambiguous physical stimuli mimic perceptual alterations in the 
absence of rivalry processes (e.g. [59,56] and review in [58, pp. 86–8]). In analysing the 
relevant data, replay activation is subtracted from rivalry activation before comparing 
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activation in active and passive conditions. Differential activation in an area then evinces its 
causal role in eliciting a transition. 
Our question is not this causal question, however. It is whether cognition is 
constitutively involved in consciousness, and so (granting their association) whether frontal 
areas form part of the constitutive basis of consciousness. The methodology of subtracting 
replay activity, however, means that results like Frässle et al.’s are silent on this question. For 
suppose frontal areas do not cause rivalry transitions, and that disambiguation occurs earlier 
in the perceptual hierarchy. (For evidence that this is at least sometimes the case see [60].) On 
this supposition, activity later in the perceptual hierarchy may well be identical in (properly 
matched) replay and rivalry conditions. Consequently, subtraction analysis will not reveal 
any differential activity. For all that, frontal activity may be a necessary condition for 
conscious perception. 
In fact there are two possibilities to consider. First, distinguish between core and total 
neural correlates of a given conscious state (NCCs) [61]. A total NCC is the physical state 
unconditionally sufficient for being in a given conscious state. A core NCC is the part of this 
total realizer responsible for the state being the specific conscious state it is—crudely, its 
content. As just argued, results like Frässle et al.’s are quite consistent with frontal areas 
forming part of the core NCC [62]. This is because they are quite consistent with content-
specific activation in frontal areas being necessary for awareness. However, even if frontal 
areas exhibit no content-specific frontal activity at all once activity attributable to executive 
upshots of awareness is factored out, frontal areas may still form part of the total NCC. This 
is because non-differential frontal activity may be a necessary condition of any non-frontal 
core NCC constituting a total NCC (cf. [63, p. 164] and also [8, p. 15] citing [64]). That even 
such an extreme finding is consistent with the Access Hypothesis highlights the limits of 
rivalry based paradigms in overcoming the methodological puzzle (see also [65,66]). 
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5. Approaching Phenomenal Consciousness as a Natural Kind 
Block [1] claims that, armed with a sufficiently wide range of psychological and 
neuroscientific evidence, inference to the best explanation will overcome the methodological 
puzzle. Explicitly building on this idea, Shea presents a “systematic framework” for 
investigating the Access Hypothesis. The core idea of this framework is to study 
“phenomenal consciousness as a natural kind”, thereby allowing us to “move beyond initial 
means of identifying instances … like verbal report … [and] find its underlying nature” [3, p. 
307]. 
Shea’s precise proposal can be summarized as follows. Our inquiry begins with 
defeasible evidence, E (e.g. verbal report, intentional action), for the attribution of 
consciousness. Based on E, we generate a large sample of putative cases of consciousness. 
We then examine that sample looking for distinctive neural and functional signatures or tests 
(Ti). Shea mentions a number of possible examples including: insensitivity to the automatic 
stem completion effect [67], trace conditioning [68], and gamma-band neural synchrony [69]. 
Finally, we exploit causal modelling techniques to search for nomological clusters amongst 
these signatures. A set of properties form a cluster just if “(i) they are instantiated together 
better than chance (given background theory); and (ii) observing subsets of the cluster 
supports induction to other elements of the cluster” (p. 326). 
How is this procedure intended to overcome the methodological puzzle? The thought 
is that if we treat consciousness as a natural property then, insofar as it is not always co-
instantiated with cognitive access it will have distinctive consequences which causal 
modelling will uncover. In this light, Shea suggests that discovering only one cluster would 
be “good evidence” (p. 330) in favour of the Access Hypothesis, whereas the discovery of 
two clusters would be “some evidence” (p. 309) against it. In this latter case, our procedure 
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will have arrived at a test (or battery of tests, Ti-j) which provides a better indicator of the 
presence of consciousness than our initial evidence E. This test will be capable of evidencing 
consciousness in the absence of access, thereby overcoming the methodological puzzle. 
Shea’s paper is ambitious and important. It deserves serious study. Here, however, I 
raise a series of critical issues which cast doubt on the contention that a science of 
consciousness which proceeds according to his framework will eventually solve the 
methodological puzzle. 
First, Shea’s proposal supposes that, at the outset of inquiry, we have evidence 
sufficient to provide us with samples which everyone will agree are respectively mostly 
conscious and mostly not conscious. It is undoubtedly true that some measures such as 
explicit verbal report of awareness do provide fairly uncontroversial positive evidence of 
consciousness. However, such superficial consensus masks the fact that even very early on in 
our inquiry we face profound and longstanding controversies concerning how to measure 
consciousness. Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to think that our initial choice of evidence 
will make a dramatic difference to our initial sample—a difference dramatic enough to 
change the number of clusters eventually found by our causal modelling. For example, 
consider Marcel’s claim that: “There is really only one criterion for phenomenal experience. 
This is person’s report … that they are or were conscious in one or another way…” [70, p. 
131] (see also [71, p. 76] and [72, p. 1396]). Contrast this view with the “conventional” 
criterion for awareness adopted by many psychophysicists, namely above chance 
performance in a discrimination task as measured by a bias-free statistic such as d' [73–76]. 
Both “subjective” and “objective” approaches have been claimed to be traditional starting 
points for a science of consciousness. Moreover, quite plausibly which approach one adopts 
will dramatically alter the course of one’s future investigation. For example, many of the tests 
which Shea mentions as possible differential markers of phenomenal consciousness will 
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count as such on a “subjective” approach but not on an “objective” approach (see, for 
example, [77] on insensitivity to the automatic stem completion effect, and [78] on trace 
conditioning). Given this, it is unclear whether all parties can even agree how to take the first 
step within Shea’s framework. 
Second, a key background assumption of Shea’s approach is that cognitive access 
corresponds to “an information-processing mechanism … for making information directly 
available for use in directing a wide range of potential behaviours” (pp. 312–3). Shea takes 
the postulation of such a mechanism to be “plausible” (p. 314), associating it with Dehaene 
and Naccache’s global neuronal workspace. However, he suggests: “The simplest way in 
which it could turn out that there is phenomenality without access … is if we discover that 
there is no [such] information processing property” (p. 314). We should undoubtedly be live 
to the possibility that there is no unified mechanism which underlies cognitive access. 
Dennett [79] talks of information being globally available as “fame in the brain”. Since 
plainly societal fame is not the product of any single, unified mechanism, why not also neural 
fame? However, if we are rightly open to this possibility, then we must also be open to the 
possibility that no unified mechanism underlies phenomenal consciousness. And once this is 
appreciated, it becomes clear that a failure to discover a mechanism of access would not 
falsify the Access Hypothesis. An alternative possibility is simply that neither consciousness 
nor access have a corresponding unified, subpersonal mechanism. Furthermore, once we 
acknowledge the possibility that phenomenal consciousness might fail to correspond to a 
single, unified subpersonal mechanism, we must acknowledge that discovery of only a single 
kind associated with access fails to support the Access Hypothesis. For that discovery is quite 
consistent with access corresponding to a single, unified mechanism but not phenomenal 
consciousness. 
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Finally, and most importantly, suppose that we do in fact discover two closely 
connected clusters or kinds. Call these K1 and K2 (Figure 1(a)). In this scenario Shea suggests 
that we would have “reason” (p. 337) to suppose K2 = cognitive access, and K1 = phenomenal 
consciousness. This would contradict the Access Hypothesis since the merely causal 
connection between kinds could in principle be broken, leading to the instantiation of 
consciousness (K1) in the absence of access (K2) (Figure 1(b)). 
 
 
Fig. 1. (a) Hypothetical situation in which causal modelling uncovers two kinds underlying our range 
of putative tests for phenomenal consciousness; (b) The identification of K1 with phenomenal 
consciousness, and K2 with cognitive access; (c) The identification of K1 with pre-consciousness and 
K2 with both phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access. Based on figures from [3, p. 333]. 
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However, recall that current workspace models postulate a distinction between 
information which is “in contact with the workspace and could be consciously amplified if it 
was attended to (set I2)” and information which is actually “mobilized into the workspace (set 
I3)”. Further, recall that current disputes about the Access Hypothesis are effectively debates 
about whether to associate consciousness with I2 or I3. Thus, Block [1] claims that I2 
representations are plausibly phenomenally conscious, whereas Dehaene and colleagues [8,9] 
suggest that these are merely pre-conscious (supporting an illusion of rich experience) with 
only I3 representations strictly being conscious. In this light, the concern naturally arises as to 
why we should not think that K1 (like I2) = pre-consciousness, and K2 = both phenomenal 
consciousness and cognitive access (Figure 1(c)). 
The point is not that being in contact with, and being mobilized into the workspace 
should be treated as legitimate kind properties. (Although Shea assumes that the latter is an 
information-based kind for the purposes of his argument, his central point is that debates 
about the Access Hypothesis have hitherto failed to proceed in a natural kind-based way, so it 
can hardly be assumed that we already know which kinds there are.) The point is rather that 
since defenders of the Access Hypothesis already recognize a category of pre-conscious 
representations, a very natural interpretation of the discovery of two clusters is open to them. 
On this interpretation the first kind is identified with pre-consciousness, and the second with 
both access and phenomenal consciousness. Given this, it is difficult to see how the discovery 
of two clusters would provide significant evidence against the Access Hypothesis. 
Shea defends his identification of K1 with phenomenal consciousness as follows: 
“Our concept [of phenomenal consciousness] refers to whatever property underpins the 
successful inductions in which it is deployed” (p. 335). K1 “underpins some of those 
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inductions” (ibid.). Moreover, some of the clustering between our evidential tests, Ti, for K1 
and K2 “depends on direct causal connections of some of [these tests] to [K1]” (ibid.). It 
follows, Shea claims, that our concept of phenomenal consciousness refers to K1. The 
problem, however, is that exactly parallel reasoning can be given for treating K2 as the 
referent of our concept of phenomenal consciousness. K2 underpins some of the successful 
inductions in which the concept of consciousness is deployed, and some of the clustering 
between evidential tests depends on direct causal connections to K2. 
In short, if we find two clusters, these will be both be directly connected to some of 
our putative signatures for consciousness, and jointly responsible for the normal clustering of 
these signatures. As a result, the proposal that our concept of phenomenal consciousness 
refers to whatever property underpins these successful inductions simply leaves us torn. This 
closely mirrors contemporary debates concerning the Access Hypothesis where theorists such 
as Dehaene, Block and Lamme broadly agree on the existence of two categories of 
representation but dispute whether the first category is phenomenal consciousness or merely 
pre-consciousness. 
6. Conclusion 
We have now reviewed both empirical and theoretical attempts to overcome the 
methodological puzzle facing the study of phenomenal consciousness. All have been found 
wanting. No argument has been given that the Access Hypothesis is beyond the reach of 
empirical investigation. Nonetheless, given our present data and methods, not only do we not 
know whether consciousness requires cognition, we do not know how to find out. Until that 
changes, we must adopt an attitude of humility towards the phenomenal. 
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i
 “At best” because it is equally unclear how the contrary hypothesis that consciousness requires access can be 
empirically confirmed or falsified. Thus, absent a priori strictures, we would seem to face an instance of 
underdetermination of theory by empirical data (cf. [80]) to which humility, not partisanship, would seem the 
rational response. 
ii
 Though granted here, the assumption that frontal activity is essential for cognitive access is far from beyond 
question. Even on a global workspace picture, Dehaene and Naccache “see no need to postulate that any single 
brain area is systematically activated in all conscious states” [8, p.14], and later emphasize the contributions of 
neurons in inferior parietal cortex (p. 26). Moreover, recent evidence suggests that simple working memory 
tasks may be performed without any frontal activation (see [80], cited and discussed in [81]). Greater clarity 
about cognitive access and its neural basis is of critical relevance in assessing the significance of the so-called 
visual awareness negativity (VAN) sometimes claimed to be an index of awareness independent of global 
broadcasting [83–85]. 
iii
 Strictly, whilst Frässle et al. [56] found no significant differential activation in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
significant activations were found in other frontal regions, including frontal eye fields and inferior frontal gyrus. 
This is consistent with other work suggesting differential, report-independent frontal activity in rivalry [59,86–
88]. However, such activity might reasonably be argued to reflect residual executive consequences of shifts in 
awareness (e.g. attentional reorienting) which passive viewing fails to eliminate. This view is supported by 
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Brascamp et al.’s inspired “inconspicuous” rivalry paradigm in which displays of statistically and chromatically-
identical quasi-randomly moving dots were used to induce unnoticeable perceptual shifts thereby minimizing 
executive consequences of transitions [89]. In this paradigm, no differential (switch-related) frontoparietal 
activity was found. Controversy remains since Brascamp et al.’s univariate voxel-wise analysis of the imaging 
cannot be relied on to guarantee an absence of differential activity (see also [54, p. 10884]). 
